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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
On December 19, 2013, the retailer Target announced that
unauthorized third parties had gained access to its customer payment
information.1 While Target originally estimated that the security breach
affected 40 million of its customers, a subsequent investigation revealed
that anywhere from 70 to 110 million people—almost one in three
Americans—may have had their sensitive payment information stolen.2 In
response, the retailer offered free credit monitoring services and assured
affected customers that they would not be responsible for fraudulent
charges made with their payment information.3 But these actions could
not placate all customers impacted by the breach; less than a month after
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Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-millioncustomers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FV24-SJTP.
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Id.
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Joel Schectman, Target Faces Nearly 70 Lawsuits Over Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15,
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its first announcement, Target faced sixty-eight class action lawsuits in
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia.4
[2]
Though of exceptional size, the Target data breach is just one of
many recent incidents where businesses have lost or exposed the sensitive
personal information—often referred to as personally identifiable
information, or “PII”—of their customers. The frequency and extent of
these breaches have grown considerably over the past decade. One
organization estimates that the number of reported data-loss incidents has
increased from 157 in 2005 to 1,467 in 2013.5 According to another
organization, since 2005 over 4,455 data breaches have resulted in the
exposure of over 620 million records.6 What is more, this increase in data
breaches has occurred at the same time as advances in technology have
enabled businesses to track, collect, and store information about their
customers with unprecedented scale and sophistication.7
[3]
The dramatic increase in both data breaches and data collection has
led to a concomitant increase in litigation.8 In particular, the past decade
4

Id.

5

See Data Loss Statistics, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/statistics (last visited
Sept. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TN3R-FYC3.
6

See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/id-theft/data-breaches.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/BP93-BMTL.
7

See, e.g., Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL.
ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2010, 12:01AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704368004576027751867039730.html
(documenting how third-party applications on smartphones can transmit information
about the phone’s user, including age, gender, and other personal details), archived at
http://perma.cc/M3UP-643W.
8

See Dana Post & Anupreet Singh Amole, Anticipate Litigation After Data Breaches,
LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202667090150/Anticipate-Litigation-AfterData-Breaches, archived at http://perma.cc/HHY6-5LBZ.
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has witnessed the rise of two different types of lawsuits. First, customers
have begun suing companies that lose their PII in data breaches, often
alleging that the breach has caused them an increased risk of falling victim
to identity theft. Second, individuals have filed lawsuits challenging how
businesses collect, track, and share PII. Plaintiffs in these cases, often
users of social networking websites or smart devices, have alleged that the
defendant businesses gathered, without consent, their contact information,
web browsing history, and even physical location.
[4]
Plaintiffs in both types of lawsuits, however, have frequently
encountered a common hurdle: the requirement under Article III of the
United States Constitution that a plaintiff have “standing” to sue.9 In
particular, some courts have been reluctant to conclude that a plaintiff who
has had her PII either collected or lost has experienced the type of
concrete injury—often referred to as “injury-in-fact”—that grants her
access to the judicial system. Plaintiffs have responded by advancing a
number of different theories for why they have suffered injury-in-fact.
Plaintiffs in data breach cases have most commonly argued that their
injury arises from an increased risk of identity theft.10 Plaintiffs in data
collection cases, meanwhile, have argued that their PII has intrinsic
economic value or that the collection of their PII breached express or
implied contracts between them and the defendant.11 These arguments for
injury-in-fact have divided federal courts. Commentators, meanwhile,
have suggested different ways to address this legal issue.12
9

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

10

See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig. 996 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 970 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
11

See, e.g., In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 299, 326 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2012).
12

See, e.g., Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand on: Finding
Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security
Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 789 (2013); Miles L. Galbraith, Comment,
Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing for Data Security
Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1399 (2013);
Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19
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[5]
Although the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue of
standing to challenge data collection and storage by private businesses, it
recently addressed the standing of litigants to challenge data collection by
the government. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs who sought to bring a constitutional challenge to
a federal foreign surveillance law lacked standing because they had failed
to allege that the law created a sufficiently “impending” risk of future
harm to them.13 Many commentators quickly suggested that Clapper,
although arising from the national security sphere, could be a potential
game-changer for data privacy litigation.14 But the few data breach
decisions so far to address Clapper in detail have reached different
conclusions about its impact on existing standing law.15 Whether Clapper
will produce a uniform approach to data privacy claims in lower courts
remains to be seen.
[6]
This article provides an overview of the various theories of
standing that plaintiffs have advanced in data privacy cases and the
success those theories have had in federal courts. It then considers what
impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper may have for these
theories going forward. Part I provides a summary of the Supreme
Court’s decisions on standing, and in particular those decisions that have
addressed claims of injury premised on an increased risk of future harm.
Part II catalogs the decisions in which courts have evaluated the Article III
GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 144 (2011) ; James Graves, Comment, “Medical” Monitoring
for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the Reasonable Necessity of Measures to Avoid
Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2, ¶¶ 39–41, 51 (2009),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i1/article2.pdf.
13

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).

14

See, e.g., Alison Frankel, How SCOTUS Wiretap Ruling Helps Internet Privacy
Defendants, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2013/03/12/how-scotus-wiretap-ruling-helps-internet-privacy-defendants/,
archived at http://perma.cc/H4UU-CX5J.
15

See infra section IV.
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standing of plaintiffs seeking damages for the collection, transfer, or
disclosure of their PII. Part III evaluates the effect that Clapper has had
on these cases so far, and explores what potential effects Clapper may
have in the future. Part IV sets forth some tentative conclusions about
what Clapper means for future data privacy litigation.
II. PROVING INJURY-IN-FACT UNDER ARTICLE III
[7]
Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to hear only
“cases” or “controversies.”16 These two words are the basis for the legal
doctrine known as Article III “standing”: the idea that a plaintiff must
demonstrate she has an actual, concrete interest at stake in her case and
therefore may invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. 17 Courts most
often describe Article III standing as having three separate components:
(1) injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. The Supreme Court has
described these requirements as follows:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the
result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”18
Establishing the first of these requirements—injury-in-fact—is often
straightforward. If a plaintiff has suffered some sort of injury, be it
16

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

17

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

18

Id. (citation omitted).
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monetary, physical, or even aesthetic, then she has suffered injury-in-fact.
With respect to present injuries, standing problems typically arise only if
the injury is a “generalized grievance” shared by a large number of
people.19 With respect to future injuries, however, the law of standing
becomes more complex. The Supreme Court has decided a significant
number of decisions on how likely an alleged future injury must be before
it can support standing under Article III: in other words, whether an injury
is, as the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife described, “actual or
imminent” or “conjectural or hypothetical.”20
A. Standing and the Risk of Future Injury
[8]
Clapper was not the first Supreme Court decision to consider when
a risk of future harm is sufficiently probable to support Article III
standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has considered iterations of this
question a number of times before. Below is a brief a summary of some of
the Court’s more notable decisions on the issue.
[9]
Perhaps the Court’s most influential case on the topic of future
harm and injury-in-fact is City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.21 The plaintiff in
Lyons sued the City of Los Angeles after being stopped by Los Angeles
police officers and subjected to what he alleged was an illegal
chokehold.22 He sought damages as well as an injunction preventing the
Los Angeles Police Department from using the same chokehold in the
future.23 While the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff had standing
to pursue damages for his past encounter with police, it held that he did
not have standing to pursue injunctive relief because he had not
19

See id. at 575.

20

Id. at 560.

21

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

22

Id. at 97.

23

Id. at 98.
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demonstrated a “real and immediate threat” of being subjected to the
chokehold again in the future.24 For the plaintiff’s alleged harm to be
sufficiently “real” to support standing, the Court explained, would require
the “incredible assertion” that (1) the plaintiff would be stopped by the
police again, and (2) that either all police officers employed such a
chokehold in every encounter or there was an official policy for them to
do so.25
[10] The Supreme Court has addressed standing based on the risk of
future harm a number of times since Lyons. In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the
Court found no injury-in-fact for an Arkansas death row inmate who
sought to intervene on behalf of another inmate who had been sentenced to
death but had waived his right to appeal. 26 The plaintiff argued that he
had standing because Arkansas’ system of “comparative review” in death
penalty cases meant that a favorable resolution of the second inmate’s
sentence could affect his own, though only if his current sentence was
vacated in a habeas corpus proceeding and he was then retried,
reconvicted, and re-sentenced.27 The Court held that this chain of future
events was “too speculative” to support standing.28 It explained that
“[a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of
Art. III,” and that “[a] threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to
constitute injury in fact.”29
[11] In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., the Court held that a group of plaintiffs did have standing to
24

Id. at 105.

25

Id. at 106.

26

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151, 156–57 (1990).

27

Id. at 156.

28

Id. at 157.

29

Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
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seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the owners of a waste
treatment plant that was allegedly discharging illegal amounts of mercury
into a local river.30 The plaintiffs had filed affidavits explaining how their
fear of excessive mercury had limited their recreational use of the river.31
The Court concluded that these “reasonable concerns” about pollution
“directly affected [plaintiffs’] recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests” and therefore established injury-in-fact.32
The Court
distinguished the plaintiffs’ declarations from declarations made by the
plaintiffs in Lujan; the Lujan plaintiffs had failed to establish injury-infact, the Court explained, because they made “conditional” statements
about how they would “some day” visit areas affected by challenged
government action.33 The Court distinguished Lyons, meanwhile, on the
ground that the “unlawful conduct—discharging pollutants in excess of
permit limits—was occurring at the time the complaint was filed.”34
[12] The Court more recently found the risk of future harm to establish
injury-in-fact in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.35 The plaintiffs in
Monsanto were a group of conventional alfalfa farmers who had
challenged a government decision to deregulate a variety of genetically
engineered alfalfa.36 The plaintiffs filed declarations stating that if the
30

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 175–76,
183, 189 (2000).
31

Id. at 181-83.

32

Id. at 184.

33

Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).

34

Id. at 184.

35

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010).; see also Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734–35 (2008)(finding standing based on future harm); Mass. v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007)(finding standing based on future harm). But see
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009) (rejecting argument of
standing based on future harm).
36

Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 139.
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deregulation proceeded their crops would be close enough to farms with
the genetically engineered alfalfa that cross-pollination between the two
varieties could occur.37 The Court held that the farmers had standing to
seek injunctive relief because the “substantial risk” of gene flow would
injure them in several ways, including by requiring them to test their
alfalfa for genetically engineered crops and to take measures to minimize
the risk of gene flow.38 The Court observed that the farmers would suffer
these injuries from deregulation whether or not gene flow actually
occurred.39
[13] As these decisions indicate, the Supreme Court has articulated
different formulations as to when a risk of future harm may constitute
injury-in-fact. Unsurprisingly, lower courts have done the same. As
commentators have noted, different circuits have applied arguably
different substantive standards for determining whether a risk of future
harm constitutes injury-in-fact under Article III.40 Some circuit decisions
have stated that this risk of future injury must be “credible” or realistic.41
Other circuits, meanwhile, have suggested that nearly any increase in a
risk of future harm may be sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. For
example, the Second Circuit concluded in a 2003 decision that an
“enhanced risk” of contracting food-borne illnesses established injury-infact.42 The Seventh Circuit has stated “even a small probability of injury
is sufficient to create a case or controversy.”43
37

Id. at 153.

38

Id. at 153–54.

39

Id. at 155.

40

See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012).

41

See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 2006) (increased risk of
harm must be “neither speculative nor remote”), vacated as moot by 473 F.3d 692, 694
(6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to establish “demonstrably increased risk” of harm);
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S., 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring “credible
threat of harm”).
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B. Clapper v. Amnesty International
[14] With the foregoing cases as a backdrop, the Supreme Court again
addressed the subject of standing and future harm in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA.44 At issue in Clapper were amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), which, among other things,
regulates the government’s interception of communications for foreign
intelligence purposes.45 Before the amendments’ enactment in 2008,
section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, allowed the government to
conduct electronic foreign intelligence surveillance only if it could
establish before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that
it had probable cause both that “the target of the electronic surveillance is
a foreign power or [its] agent” and that each of the places to be monitored
were being used by that foreign power or agent.46 The 2008 amendments
replaced these requirements with a more permissive rule that the
government need only use procedures “reasonably designed” to limit
surveillance of United States citizens and to comply with the Fourth
Amendment.47
[15] The day the amendments were enacted, plaintiffs—a group of
lawyers, journalists, and activists—filed suit seeking a declaration that the
changes to FISA’s probable cause requirements were unconstitutional.48
42

See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003).

43

Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir.
2011) (quoting Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)).
44

Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).

45

Id. at 1140, 1147.

46

See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).

47

See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145.

48

Id. at 1140, 1142.
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The plaintiffs argued that they had standing to sue because their work
“requires them to engage in sensitive international communications with
individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance” under the
amended FISA.49 They claimed that the amendments to § 1881a would
compromise their ability to communicate with clients or sources and that
the risk of surveillance under § 1881a would compel them to undertake
“costly and burdensome measures,” including traveling abroad to meet
clients in person, to protect confidentiality.50
[16] While the district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the
Second Circuit reversed.51 According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs
had standing due to the “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their
communications would be subject to the newly authorized government
surveillance.52 The plaintiffs also had standing, the Second Circuit
explained, because their expenditures to avoid government surveillance
were “present injuries” that stemmed “from a reasonable fear of future
harmful government conduct.”53
[17] The Supreme Court reversed.54 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, noted two aspects of the case that he viewed as counseling for a
conservative approach to the standing issue.55 First, the plaintiffs’ suit
challenged the constitutionality of actions taken by other branches of
government.56 Second, their suit challenged actions of those branches “in
49

Id. at 1142.

50

Id. at 1143.

51

Id. at 1155.

52

Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011).

53

Id. at 138.

54

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.

55

Id. at 1147.

56

Id.
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the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”57 Though not
expressly incorporating these aspects of the case into the majority
opinion’s subsequent standing analysis, Justice Alito noted that previous
standing inquiries had been “especially rigorous” in the first category of
cases,58 and that the Court had “often found a lack of standing” in the
latter category.59
[18] Turning first to the plaintiffs’ claim that they had standing because
of the reasonable likelihood that they would be subject to government
surveillance, Justice Alito concluded that the Second Circuit’s
“objectively reasonable likelihood” standard was “too speculative to
satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury must be
‘certainly impending.’”60 While the majority opinion, citing language
from previous decisions, left open the possibility that a “substantial risk”
of future harm could also constitute injury-in-fact,61 Justice Alito
concluded that the plaintiffs’ “attenuated chain of possibilities” would fail
even that standard.62 According to Justice Alito, the plaintiffs’ theory of
harm depended on the occurrence of no less than five successive events:
(1) that the Government would target the plaintiffs’ clients or sources; (2)
that this surveillance was authorized under § 1881a; (3) that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court would approve such surveillance; (4) that
the Government would succeed in carrying out the surveillance; and (5)
that the Government would monitor plaintiffs’ own communications with
those clients or sources.63
57

Id.

58

Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59

Id. at 1147.

60

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.

61

Id. at 1150 n.5.

62

Id. at 1148.

63

See id. at 1148–50.

12

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

[19] Turning next to the plaintiffs’ claim that they had and would
continue to undertake burdensome measures to protect themselves from
government surveillance, Justice Alito held that such measures were not
traceable to § 1881a.64 Justice Alito rejected the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that a litigant could establish standing by incurring costs to
mitigate any fear of surveillance that was not “fanciful, paranoid, or
otherwise unreasonable.”65 As Justice Alito explained, Article III did not
allow the plaintiffs to “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not
certainly impending.”66 The plaintiffs similarly could not establish
standing on the basis of their clients’ reluctance to speak with them,
because such behavior was “based on third parties’ subjective fear of
surveillance.”67
[20] Finally, Justice Alito distinguished several previous decisions
where the Court had found standing based on a risk of future harm.68
First, the majority explained that the Court’s prior decision in Laidlaw
involved wrongdoing that all parties conceded was ongoing, whereas in
the facts before it in Clapper the plaintiffs had not proven that the
government was monitoring them under § 1881a.69 Second, the majority
distinguished a First Amendment case, Meese v. Keene,70 which involved
a plaintiff who desired to show three films labeled as “political
propaganda,” and who was, unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, “unquestionably
64

Id. at 1151.

65

Id.

66

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.

67

Id. at 1152 n.7.

68

Id. at 1153.

69

Id. at 1153.

70

Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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regulated” by the statute that he wished to challenge.71 Third, the majority
noted that the plaintiffs in Geertson Seed Farms had demonstrated
concrete facts showing that gene flow could occur between their alfalfa
and genetically modified alfalfa, whereas the plaintiffs in Clapper “present
no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but instead rest on mere
conjecture about possible governmental actions.”72
[21] The majority opinion concluded with a summary of its central
holding: the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing “because they cannot
demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly fear is certainly
impending and because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.”73
[22] Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, dissented.74 According to Justice Breyer, the majority opinion,
and in particular its reliance on the phrase “certainty impending,” set a
stricter requirement for injury-in-fact based on a risk of future harm than
had past cases.75 As Justice Breyer explained, “certainty is not, and never
has been, the touchstone of standing.”76 Rather, “what the Constitution
requires is something more akin to ‘reasonable probability’ or ‘high
probability.’”77 For support, Justice Breyer gathered previous decisions
from the Court where injury-in-fact had been found on the basis of, among

71

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153.

72

Id. at 1154 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755
(2010)).
73

Id. at 1155.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 1165.

76

Id. at 1160. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

77

See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1165.

14

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

other things, “realistic,” “substantial,” and “reasonable” risks of harm.78
His opinion further argued, citing to both Supreme Court and circuit court
decisions, that “courts have often found probabilistic injuries sufficient to
support standing.”79 Justice Breyer concluded that he would have found
the plaintiffs in Clapper to possess Article III standing.80
III. INJURY-IN-FACT IN DATA BREACH AND DATA COLLECTION CASES
[23] Over half a decade before the Supreme Court addressed Article III
standing to challenge government collection of private information in
Clapper, lower courts began addressing a separate, though closely related,
issue: Article III standing to challenge private collection, retention, and
disclosure of private information. This section catalogs those cases and
the different conclusions they have reached on the issue of standing; cases
interpreting Clapper’s standing analysis are discussed in the following
section.
[24] This Article uses the terms “data breach cases” and “data
collection cases” to describe the two different types of data privacy
lawsuits that have emerged in recent years. The term “data breach cases”
refers to lawsuits arising from the defendant’s inadvertent loss or
disclosure of a plaintiff’s PII. Data breach cases generally focus on the
increased risk of identity theft following a breach, and plaintiffs
“customarily seek to recover their expenditures on credit monitoring,
credit and debit card cancellation fees, and repayment for unauthorized
charges.”81

78

See id. at 1161–62.

79

Id. at 1162.

85

Id. at 1165.

81

Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96587, at *10 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012).
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[25] The term “data collection cases,” meanwhile, refers to lawsuits that
arise from a defendant’s intentional collection, storage, or sharing of the
plaintiff’s PII. These cases most typically involve either information
shared on social networking websites, information surreptitiously
collected by Internet “cookies,” or information collected by smartphones
or similar devices. While some data collection cases also focus on the risk
of identity theft, most are driven by more traditional privacy concerns; the
PII at issue often includes the plaintiff’s shopping habits, web-browsing
history, or even physical location. The theories of liability in data
collection lawsuits are more varied than in data breach lawsuits, with
plaintiffs often seeking damages under breach-of-contract theories, state
consumer protection laws, or federal statutes.
[26] While data breach and data collection cases have raised a number
of different legal issues, this Article focuses only on the issue of Article III
standing. Many of the decisions discussed below found plaintiffs to have
standing but nonetheless dismissed their claims on substantive grounds.
This includes decisions that concluded that, while the plaintiffs may have
alleged an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement, they had not alleged an injury sufficient to satisfy the
damages requirement of a state-law negligence or breach-of-contract
claim.82
A. Data Breach Cases
[27] Plaintiffs in data breach cases have advanced several different
theories of injury-in-fact. Most commonly, plaintiffs have contended that
they suffered injury-in-fact from an increased risk of identity theft after
their personal information has been compromised in a breach. Most
plaintiffs relatedly contend that expenses they have incurred to mitigate
this risk—for example, credit monitoring or cancellation of credit cards—
constitute a separate basis for injury-in-fact. A smaller number of
82

See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding
that plaintiffs had standing but had not alleged damages that were compensable under
Indiana law).
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plaintiffs have argued that they have suffered injury-in-fact due to their
anxiety and distress upon learning about the loss of their personal
information. Finally, some plaintiffs have sought to establish injury-infact on the theory that the loss of their personal information breached an
implied contract with the defendant. This section assesses each theory in
turn.
1. Increased Risk of Identity Theft and Measures
Taken to Mitigate that Risk
[28] Among plaintiffs’ arguments for injury-in-fact in data breach
lawsuits, by far the most common are the related arguments that: (1) the
plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of future
identity theft; and (2) the plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact due to the
expenses required to mitigate such risk of future identity theft. Though
they are distinct arguments, courts have generally treated these two
theories of injury-in-fact as rising or falling with one another.
[29] These theories of standing have achieved mixed results in lower
courts. While initial federal decisions were hostile to the idea that an
increased risk of identity theft could constitute injury-in-fact, a shift
occurred after the Seventh Circuit endorsed such a theory in Pisciotta v.
Old National Bancorp.83 Despite more success for plaintiffs after
Pisciotta, other courts have continued to find that an increased risk of
identity theft does not establish injury-in-fact, including the Third Circuit
in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.84
[30] Even though they have differed in their final conclusions, courts
have been more consistent in identifying what factors are relevant to
whether a plaintiff’s risk of future identity theft is either “real and
imminent” or “conjectural and hypothetical.” These factors include: (1)
whether a data breach has actually occurred; (2) whether the data was lost
or stolen; and (3) whether a third-party has actually used plaintiff’s
83

Id. at 634.

84

Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011).
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sensitive third-party information in a way that has caused the plaintiff
harm.
a. Injury-in-Fact Where Breached Personal
Information Has Been Used to Harm the
Plaintiff
[31] Courts have understandably found injury-in-fact in data breach
cases where third parties actually use a plaintiff’s compromised personal
information in a way that causes the plaintiff harm. In Resnick v. AvMed,
Inc. for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a health-services
company, had two laptops stolen from it that contained unencrypted files
with the plaintiffs’ health information, Social Security numbers, names,
addresses, and phone numbers.85 Ten months after the theft, one plaintiff
discovered that a third-party had used her name to open bank accounts,
activate credit cards, and make an address change.86 Another plaintiff’s
information was used to open a brokerage account.87 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the plaintiffs had established injury-in-fact by “alleg[ing] that
they have become victims of identity theft and have suffered monetary
damages as a result.”88 The Eleventh Circuit expressly reserved judgment
on whether any increased risk of future identity theft would also establish
injury-in-fact.89

85

Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012).

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 1323.

89

Id. at 1323 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No.
1:12-CV-22800-UU, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012)
(applying Resnick to conclude that plaintiff, who alleged that an unknown third-party
used his personal information to file a federal tax return and obtain a tax refund, has
alleged injury-in-fact).
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[32] The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Lambert v.
Hartman.90 The plaintiff in that case alleged that third parties had made
purchases in her name after her personal information, including her Social
Security number, was publicly posted on the Hamilton County, Ohio’s
Clerk of Courts website.91 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
had standing to pursue her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the county.92
As the court explained, the plaintiff had alleged “that her identity was
stolen and that her financial security and credit rating suffered as a
result.”93 These “actual financial injuries” were “sufficient to meet the
injury-in-fact requirement.”94 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit noted in dicta
that the plaintiff’s allegation of an increased future risk of identity theft
was “somewhat ‘hypothetical’ and ‘conjectural.’”95
[33] Mere allegations of fraudulent credit card charges, however, may
not necessarily establish injury-in-fact, even if traceable to the data breach
at issue. For example, in Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., two
plaintiffs alleged that they had discovered hundreds of dollars in
fraudulent charges on their credit and debit cards following a data breach
at the defendant company.96 Despite finding the charges “fairly traceable”
to the data breach,97 the district court concluded that neither plaintiff had
90

Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008).

91

Id. at 435–36. The information had come from a traffic citation issued to the plaintiff.
Id. at 435.
92

Id. at 438–39.

93

Id. at 437.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27764, at *6–8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).
97

Id. at *14 (quoting Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012)).
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standing to sue.98 According to the court, the plaintiffs’ failure to plead
that they either were not reimbursed for the charges or that they suffered
other fees and expenses meant that they had not alleged identity theft in a
way that created injury-in-fact.99 The decisions in Resnick and Lambert
are arguably consistent with Willingham, as both involved injuries that
went beyond fraudulent credit card charges: changes of address and
opened bank accounts in Resnick, and alleged damage to the plaintiff’s
credit score in Lambert.
b. Injury-in-Fact Where Data Has Been Stolen
[34] After situations where actual identity theft has occurred and caused
the plaintiff harm, courts are next most likely to find injury-in-fact where a
third-party has either stolen data or accessed it without authorization.
Courts generally recognize these scenarios as presenting a more real threat
of identity theft than where sensitive information is accidentally posted
online or a computer containing sensitive information is simply lost or
misplaced. Additionally, courts are even more likely to find injury-in-fact
when circumstances suggest that a third-party specifically sought the
plaintiffs’ PII. This includes situations where an unknown third-party
purposefully acquires information through computer hacking or credit card
skimming, as well as situations where plaintiffs have traced subsequent
fraudulent activity to the breach.
[35] These cases are also where the debate over Article III standing has
most frequently arisen. Decisions from the Seventh and Ninth Circuit
have held that the risk of future identity theft is sufficiently imminent in a
data-theft context to establish injury-in-fact, while the Third Circuit has
98

Id. at *23–26.

99

Id. at *19–24. But see Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-22800-UU,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *7–9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012) (arguing that actual
misuse of sensitive personal information even devoid of monetary loss is sufficient to
confer standing). A possible distinction between Willingham and Burrows is that the
latter case involved unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name and Social Security number,
whereas the former appears to have only involved misuse of credit and debit card
information.

20

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

held that it is not.100 While the Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuit’s
decisions are arguably factually distinguishable, they have contributed to a
continuing split among district courts over whether standing exists in cases
where a third-party purposefully compromises the plaintiff’s PII.
[36] In Pisciotta, the Seventh Circuit held that an increased risk of
future identity theft was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for customers
of a bank whose confidential records had been accessed by a third-party
hacker.101 The nature of the unauthorized access “suggest[ed] that the
intrusion was sophisticated, intentional, and malicious.”102 While the
customers did not allege to have experienced any direct financial loss or
actual identity theft, they argued that they still had standing to pursue their
claims for credit monitoring costs due to their increased risk of suffering
future identity theft and the expenses they incurred to mitigate that risk.103
The Seventh Circuit agreed, and stated that “the injury-in-fact requirement
can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would
have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”104
[37] To support its conclusion, the court in Pisciotta cited to previous
Seventh Circuit decisions stating that a mere risk of future harm was
sufficient for injury-in-fact.105 The court also relied in part on decisions
that endorsed Article III standing for medical monitoring claims in toxic

100

Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011), with Pisciotta v.
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,
628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)).
101

Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631.

102

Id. at 632.

103

See id.

104

Id. at 634.

105

Id. at 634 n.4 (“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or
controversy . . . .” (quoting Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)).

21

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

tort and medical device cases.106 In discussing the separate issue of
whether damages were available to the customers under Indiana law, the
court described toxic tort medical monitoring cases as “somewhat
analogous,” though it ultimately noted that Indiana had yet to recognize
such claims.107
[38] In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit also found an
allegedly increased risk of future identity theft to be sufficient to establish
injury-in-fact.108 The data breach in Krottner occurred when an unknown
party stole a laptop with “unencrypted names, addresses, and social
security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.”109
While the plaintiffs did not allege that they had experienced any financial
harm, one plaintiff alleged that someone had attempted to open a bank
account with his social security number.110 The plaintiffs further alleged
that they had and would continue to spend time and money monitoring
their credit and finances for potential fraudulent activity.111 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had established injury-in-fact by
alleging a “credible threat of harm.”112 The court noted that the risk of
future harm had been sufficient to support standing in both the
environmental113 and toxic tort114 contexts, as well as in the data breach
106

See id. n.3 (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2nd Cir.
2006); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also
Graves, supra note 12, at ¶ 12 (explaining that medical monitoring claims seek “recovery
of the costs of medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting
from [the] . . . defendant’s actions.”).
107

Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638–39.

108

Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).

109

Id. at 1140.

110

Id. at 1141.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 1143 (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950
(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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context with Pisciotta.115 It observed by way of contrast that “[w]ere
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ allegations more conjectural or hypothetical—for
example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had sued based on the
risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future—we would find the
threat far less credible.”116
[39] The Third Circuit, meanwhile, has held an increased risk of future
identity theft to not be sufficient to support a finding of injury-in-fact in a
data breach lawsuit. In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., it declined to find
standing for customers of a payroll processing firm whose financial
records had been accessed by a third-party. 117 According to the Third
Circuit, the plaintiffs’ increased risk of identity theft was “hypothetical”
and “dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown
third-party.”118 The Third Circuit distinguished both Pisciotta and
Krottner as involving clearer indicia of potential identity theft: the
intrusion in Pisciotta was “sophisticated, intentional and malicious,” and
someone had actually attempted to open a bank account with stolen
personal information in Krottner.119 The Third Circuit viewed these facts
as demonstrating a more “imminent” and “certainly impending” harm than
the present case, where there was “no evidence that the intrusion was
intentional or malicious.”120

113

Id. at 1142 (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d 938, 948–50 (9th Cir. 2002)).

114

Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (citing Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796–97
(9th Cir. 2001)).
115

Id. (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)).

116

Id. at 1143.

117

Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 40–42 (3d Cir. 2011).

118

Id. at 42.

119

Id. at 43–44 (quoting Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632).

120

Id. at 44.
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[40] Although distinguishing Pisciotta and Krottner, the Third Circuit
also expressed skepticism of both decisions’ standing analyses, and
particularly of their citation to toxic tort and medical device cases.121 In
the Third Circuit’s view, an analogy to those cases was unfounded for at
least two reasons. First, while in toxic tort and medical monitoring cases
“an injury has undoubtedly occurred,” in data breach cases “where no
misuse is alleged,” no such injury has occurred.122 Second, medical
device and toxic tort cases, as well as environmental cases, involved
human health concerns often not redressable after the fact. 123 Finally, the
court concluded that any expenditure by the plaintiffs to mitigate potential
identity theft did not convert their hypothetical injury into an “actual or
imminent” one.124 According to the court, the plaintiffs had not spent
money due to any actual injury, but rather “prophylactically spent money
to ease fears of future third-party criminality.”125
[41] District courts have likewise reached differing conclusions about
injury-in-fact when a data breach occurs in a manner that suggests
potential identity theft. An earlier Southern District of Ohio decision
concluded that a risk of future identity theft was too conjectural to support
standing126 in a case where “unauthorized persons obtained access to and
acquired the information of approximately 96,000 customers” of the
retailer DSW, Inc.127 In that case, the plaintiff alleged her “potential
injury [was] contingent upon her information being obtained and then used
by an unauthorized person for an unlawful purpose,” but had “not alleged
evidence that a third party intends to make unauthorized use of her
121

See id.

122

Id. at 4.

123

Reilly, 664 F.3d. at 45–46.

124

Id. at 46.

125

Id.

126

See Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688–89 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

127

Id. at 686.
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financial information or of her identity.”128 The court also found medical
monitoring cases inapposite, partially because they were “not inextricably
linked to the possible criminal actions of unknown third parties at some
unidentified point in the indefinite future.”129
[42] An Eastern District of Missouri court reached a similar conclusion
in Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc.130 In that case, hackers had accessed
confidential information in the defendant company’s possession and
attempted to extort the company with its threatened release. 131 The court
nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff—who did not know for certain
whether his personal data had been compromised and alleged only “an
increased risk of identify [sic] theft at an unknown point in the future”—
had not shown injury-in-fact.132 According to the court, “many ‘if’s’
would have to come to pass” for the plaintiff to suffer identity theft,
including the compromise of his data, the obtaining of that data by a thirdparty, and the use of that data to commit identity theft. 133 These events
were, in the court’s view, all hypothetical and speculative.134
[43] Similarly, in Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., a case where
plaintiffs alleged that they had actually experienced fraudulent credit and
debit card charges following a security breach,135 the Northern District of
128

Id. at 690.

129

Id. at 691.

130

See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
131

Id. at 1049.

132

Id. at 1053 (citing Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1089–90).

133

Id. at 1053.

134

See id.

135

Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27764, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).
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Georgia concluded that the risk of future identity theft likely was not
sufficiently “imminent” to establish injury-in-fact.136 Citing to Reilly, the
court noted that the plaintiffs’ alleged risk of future identity theft was
“dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown thirdparty.”137
[44] By contrast, the Southern District of California found injury-in-fact
to have been alleged when customers of Sony brought suit after hackers
accessed Sony’s computer networks and stole sensitive personal
information from millions of accounts.138 Following Krottner as binding
authority, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged injury-in-fact
because they had alleged “that their sensitive Personal Information was
wrongfully disseminated, thereby increasing the risk of future harm.”139
Similarly, the Western District of Kentucky found injury-in-fact when
plaintiffs, customers of a bank whose former employee had stolen
confidential information on 2.4 million individuals and “passed the data
on to known and unknown third parties in exchange for payments of
$70,000,” alleged that automobile loans had been applied for in their
names or that their home had been “bombarded” with telemarketing
calls.140 According to the court, the plaintiffs established injury by taking
reasonable steps to mitigate the harms of the employee’s actions,
including purchasing credit monitoring and cancelling their home phone
service.141

136

Id. at *23–25 (recommending the plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed for failure to state
a claim and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction be denied as moot).
137

Id. at *20 (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
138

In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d
942, 950–51, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
139

Id. at 958 (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010)).

140

Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96587, at *4–5, *12 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012).
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[45] Courts have also reached differing conclusions when, like in
Reilly, data has been stolen but nothing suggests that it was the thief’s
specific target.142 A good example of the difference that the apparent
motives and capabilities of a data hacker can have on a court’s standing
analysis is Allison v. Aetna, Inc.143 In that case hackers managed to gain
access to Aetna’s job application data base, which contained the sensitive
information of over 450,000 applicants, including the plaintiff’s.144 While
Aetna confirmed that the hackers obtained the e-mail addresses of some
applicants, it was unclear whether they obtained any other information; the
hackers later sent “phishing” e-mails to job applicants asking them for
more personal information.145 The plaintiff could not confirm that his email was among the ones stolen, and he had not received a phishing email.146 The district court concluded that his alleged increased risk of
future identity theft, along with the steps he had taken to mitigate that risk,
were “far too speculative” and could not establish injury-in-fact.147 The
court noted, among other things, that the hackers’ phishing e-mails
suggested that they in fact lacked the necessary information to commit
identity theft, thus distinguishing the case from the more “sophisticated”
hacking operation in Pisciotta.148
141

Id. at *12 (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Pisciotta v.
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)).
142

See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).

143

See Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373, at *18–
21 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010).
144

See id. at *1–3.

145

See id. at *2–3.

146

See id. at *3.

147

Id. at *18–21.

148

See Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373, at *24 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632).
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[46] In Randolph v. ING Life Insurance & Annuity Co., burglars stole a
laptop containing the names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of
13,000 current and former employees of the District of Columbia. 149 The
district court concluded that the risk of future identity theft was too
speculative for a finding of injury-in-fact, based either on that risk alone or
on the steps the plaintiffs had taken to mitigate the risk.150 Since the
plaintiffs had not alleged that the burglar was specifically after their
personal information, this meant that their allegations were “mere
speculation that at some unspecified point in the indefinite future they will
be the victims of identity theft.”151 The district court remanded the case to
state court, where it eventually reached the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.152 The Court of Appeals issued its own opinion, which, while
not squarely ruling on the standing issue (it dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaint for failure to state a claim), criticized the district court’s
approach and suggested that injury-in-fact would be “fairly easily
satisfied” by the plaintiffs’ statutory and tort claims,153 particularly in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao.154
[47] Two other decisions, facing similar facts, reached the opposite
conclusion and held that a threat of future identity theft did establish
injury-in-fact. In Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., a
149

See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007).

150

See id. at 7–8.

151

Id.; see also Hinton v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. 09-594 (MLC), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20675, at *1, *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2009) (dismissing a “rambling” pro se
complaint alleging that defendant had lost Plaintiff’s sensitive personal information in a
data breach where Plaintiff’s “allegations of injuries amount to nothing more than mere
speculation”).
152

See Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11.

153

Randolph, 973 A.2d at 707.

154

See id. (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004)); see also infra section III.A.2
(discussing Doe v. Chao).
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pension consulting company had several laptops containing sensitive
personal information stolen from its office, but “[n]othing in the record
shed[] light on whether the laptops were stolen for their intrinsic value, for
the value of the data or for both.”155 The district court, citing Pisciotta and
drawing an analogy to toxic tort cases, held that the threat of future
identity theft faced by the plaintiffs was sufficient to establish standing.156
In Ruiz v. Gap Inc., two laptops containing the unencrypted sensitive
personal information of over 800,000 Gap job applicants, including the
plaintiff, were stolen from a Gap vendor. 157 The district court concluded
that the plaintiff’s allegation of an increased future risk of identity theft
was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
though it suggested that more concrete allegations would be needed for the
case to move forward.158 When the defendants later brought motions for
summary judgment, the court again found standing based on an increased
risk of identity theft,159 even though it was “less clear than it was in
Pisciotta that the thief was targeting the plaintiff’s personal
information.”160 The court granted summary judgment, however, on the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.161 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the
district court’s rulings on standing and on the merits.162

155

Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
156

See id. at 279–80 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.
2007); LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir. 2002)).
157

See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124–25 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

158

See id. at 1125–26.

159

See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911–13 (N.D. Cal. 2009).

160

Id. at 912. The court noted, however, statistical evidence provided by the plaintiff that
19% of Americans notified of a data breach during the previous year had reported
becoming victims of identity theft, while only 4.32% of Americans generally did so. Id.
at 913.
161

Id. at 918.
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c. Injury-in-Fact Where Plaintiffs’ Data Has
Otherwise Been Exposed or Lost
[48] In contrast to cases where sensitive data has been stolen, courts
have been less likely to find injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of
identity theft where sensitive data has simply been lost or inadvertently
exposed. Still, even in these factual situations, courts have reached
differing conclusions about whether a risk of future identity theft is
sufficiently imminent to establish injury-in-fact under Article III.
[49] Some courts have refused to find injury-in-fact where sensitive
data has been exposed, but not necessarily exposed to criminal parties. In
one of the first cases to consider data breach lawsuits and Article III
standing, a district court held that an alleged increased risk of future
identity theft did not support injury-in-fact where the plaintiff’s personal
information had been accessed by a company’s client without
authorization and sold to a marketing company.163 The plaintiff did not
plead that, in the three years since the breach, she had either received junk
mail or suffered an identity theft.164 Likewise, a bankruptcy court found
no injury-in-fact where a creditor posted a proof of claim, which remained
public for six days, containing the debtor’s Social Security number,
driver’s license number, and date of birth.165 The court concluded on
summary judgment that the risk of identity theft was neither actual nor

162

See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Ruiz alleged, with
support from an expert affidavit, that he was at greater risk of identity theft. As the
district court properly concluded, this alleged prospective injury presents enough of a risk
that the concerns of plaintiffs are real, and not merely speculative.”).
163

See Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72477,
at *1–3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006).
164

See id. at *8.

165

See Davis v. Eagle Legacy Credit Union, 430 B.R. 902, 905, 907 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2010).
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imminent, as the debtor provided no proof that the information had been
accessed by any unauthorized party.166
[50] Other district courts have similarly refused to find injury-in-fact
established where files containing sensitive personal information were lost
in transit. In Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, a package with
financial information of tens of thousands of the defendant’s customers
was lost in the mail. 167 The district court concluded that plaintiffs’
alleged increased risk of identity theft was “speculative and hypothetical”
and did not establish injury-in-fact.168 The court rejected the argument
that the case was analogous to medical monitoring cases.169 Likewise, in
Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., the defendant company lost
a metal box containing six to ten computer back-up tapes with the
unencrypted sensitive personal information of over 12.5 million
individuals.170
Three plaintiffs alleged that they experienced
“unauthorized credit transactions” after the tapes were lost.171 The district
court held that the plaintiffs’ injury was speculative and conjectural, and
noted that it found the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Pisciotta
unpersuasive.172
166

See id. at 907.

167

Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266, at
*3–4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006).
168

Id. at *12.

169

Id. at *11 n.4.

170

Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060 (RMB) (RLE), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71996, at *9–10, *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010).
171

Id. at *17.

172

See id. at *23, *28; see also Whitaker v. Health Net of Cal. Inc., No. CIV S-11-0910
KJM-DAD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6545, at *5, *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (declining
to find standing where defendant lost several hard drives containing personal information
of over 800,000 individuals, including plaintiffs, but plaintiffs had alleged no misuse of
their information and distinguishing the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Krottner and Ruiz as
involving “the theft of information, not its loss”).
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[51] By contrast, in another lawsuit stemming from the same data
breach as Hammond, a district court found injury-in-fact to be present.173
In McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., which involved the same
loss of back-up tapes as in Hammond, the court concluded that an
increased risk of future identity theft was sufficient to confer Article III
standing.174 Unlike in Hammond, the court cited Pisciotta’s standing
analysis favorably.175
d. Injury-in-Fact Where No Data Breach Has
Occurred
[52] Finally, others decisions have considered—and rejected—Article
III standing where plaintiffs have alleged not that their personal
information had been compromised in a breach, but only that a defendant
company’s lax security practices created an intolerable likelihood that
such a breach would occur.
[53] In Katz v. Pershing, LLC, a brokerage firm customer alleged that
the defendant, a company that provided various back-office services to the
brokerage firm, used inadequate privacy measures and had exposed her
sensitive personal information to anyone with access to the defendant’s
computer network, including other customers.176 The First Circuit
concluded that without an actual identified unauthorized use of her data,
the plaintiff could not establish injury-in-fact on the theory of an increased
risk of identity theft or of expenses made to mitigate that risk.177 More
173

See McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00944(VLB), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78065, at *1–2, *13 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009).
174

See id. at *3, *7–13.

175

See id. at *11–12 (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.
2007)).
176

See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2012).

177

Id. at 79.
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recently, in Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., customers of the retail chain
Sam’s Club alleged that the company had made “numerous
misrepresentations” about how it protects its customers’ sensitive
information.178 The customers made “no allegation that their personal
information has been stolen, compromised, or fraudulently used,” nor did
they “allege that a security breach has occurred.”179 The district court held
that the customers’ alleged injury was too speculative and noted that “no
court has found that a mere increased risk of identity theft or fraud
constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes without some alleged
theft of personal data or security breach.”180
[54] Plaintiffs have brought similar claims in data collection cases: that
a company’s collection or transmittal of the plaintiffs’ personal
information, often without encryption, constitutes injury-in-fact due to the
creation of an unreasonable risk of unauthorized use.181 Courts have
generally rejected this theory of standing.182 As these cases involve
allegations of either data collection by the Defendant itself or transfer of
178

Hammer v. Sam's East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98707, at
*2 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013).
179

Id. at *3.

180

Id. at *7–8 (citing Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2012)).

181

See, e.g., Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42691, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (allegation that Defendant’s collection
and storage of Plaintiff’s personal identifying information, without anonymization,
creates a substantive risk of future harm).
182

See id. at *15–16; Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 151035, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1141–43 (9th Cir. 2010)); Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *19–20 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). But see In re iPhone
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding, with little
discussion, that the “increased, unexpected, and unreasonable risk to the security of
sensitive personal information” allegedly surreptitiously transferred from Defendant to
third-party advertisers created “actual injury”).
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information to third-party advertisers, courts have found that, even under
Krottner, any fear of future identity theft is simply too speculative.183
Perhaps equally importantly, courts have noted that the information at
issue in these cases is often not sensitive financial information.184
2. Mental Distress About Identity Theft
[55] A few plaintiffs in data breach cases have argued that they suffered
injury-in-fact due to anxiety and emotional distress caused by knowing
that they are at an increased risk of future identity theft. Much like the
theory that expenses incurred to mitigate the risk of identity theft can
establish standing, this argument has risen or fallen with courts’
assessments of the underlying likelihood of identity theft actually
occurring. Thus, Krottner, which found an increased risk of future
identity theft sufficient to establish injury-in-fact, also found that an
allegation of “generalized anxiety and stress” resulting from the data
breach constituted “present injury” that was “sufficient to confer
standing.”185 But Reilly, which did not find an increased risk of identity
theft to itself establish injury-in-fact, rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs’ emotional distress about identity theft established injury-infact.186
183

See, e.g., Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *21–22 (finding Plaintiff’s
theory of harm too speculative to establish injury-in-fact and distinguishing Krottner
because “Plaintiffs do not allege that their personal data has been stolen, only that is
susceptible to theft”).
184

See Yunker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *16 (noting that Plaintiff “does not
allege that he disclosed sensitive financial information, such as a social security number
or a credit card number”); see also In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d
1089, 1094–95 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that public posting of Plaintiff’s LinkedIn
password did not amount “to a legally cognizable injury, such as, for example, identify
[sic] theft or the theft of her personally identifiable information”).
185

Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78065, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443
F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006)) (noting that “the fear or anxiety of future harm” can
constitute injury-in-fact).
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[56] While these cases may suggest that an emotional distress argument
is unlikely to succeed as a standalone basis for injury-in-fact, potentially
complicating the matter is the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao.
The plaintiff in Doe had filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits
Act and later learned that the Department of Labor had inadvertently
disclosed his Social Security number in hearing notices sent to multiple
parties.187 The plaintiff brought suit against the federal government under
the Privacy Act,188 but did not provide any proof of injury other than
allegations that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” and “greatly concerned and
worried” about the disclosure of his Social Security number.189 The
Supreme Court did not address Article III standing, but clearly assumed
that such standing was present: its opinion focused instead on whether the
plaintiff had stated a claim under the Privacy Act.190 In her dissenting
opinion, Justice Ginsburg characterized the majority as having found that
“Doe has standing to sue” based on his alleged emotional injury.191
[57] This issue of standing and emotional harm came up in a
subsequent Privacy Act case, American Federation of Government
Employees v. Hawley. The claims in Hawley were brought by
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) employees after the TSA
lost a hard drive containing sensitive personal information on over
100,000 current and former employees.192 Bringing suit under the Privacy
Act, the employees alleged to have suffered injury in the form of, among
other things, “embarrassment, inconvenience, mental distress, concern for
186

See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–45 (3d Cir. 2011).

187

See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616–17 (2004).

188

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012).

189

Chao, 540 U.S. at 617–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

190

See id. at 616.

191

Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

192

See AFGE v. Hawley, 543 F. Supp. 2d 44, 45 (D.D.C. 2008).
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identity theft, concern for damage to credit report . . . [and] mental distress
due to the possibility of security breach at airports.”193 The district court
agreed that these allegations of mental distress “alleged injury . . . not
speculative nor dependent on any future event, such as a third party’s
misuse of the data.”194 While the court did not cite to Chao in its standing
analysis, it did cite to another Privacy Act case.195
[58] Yet in In re Science Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape
Data Theft Litigation, another judge on the same court reached a different
conclusion. The litigation in SAIC arose from the theft of several data
tapes that contained personal information and medical records of 4.7
million U.S. military members and their families.196 But the tapes did not
appear to be the target of the theft (they were stolen from a car along with
a GPS system and a stereo), and accessing their information required
specialized computer equipment.197 The district court held that the
plaintiffs could not bring a Privacy Act claim because they could not
allege “that their information has been exposed in a way that would
facilitate easy, imminent access.”198 The court distinguished Chao on the
ground that the plaintiff’s information in that case had actually been
published on documents that were sent to third-parties.199
[59] Courts have also cited to Chao in cases not involving the Privacy
Act. Despite Doe’s lack of discussion on the issue of standing, the Ninth
193

Id. at 50–51 (internal quotation marks omitted).

194

Id. at 51.

195

Id. n.12 (quoting Krieger v. Dep’t of Justice, 529 F. Supp. 2d 29, 53 (D.D.C. 2008)).

196

See In re. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *5–6 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014).
197

Id. at *5, *10.

198

Id. at *35.

199

See id. at *36 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 617 (2004)).
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Circuit in Krottner cited it in support of its own holding and characterized
the decision as “suggesting” that the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress
had established Article III standing.200 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals also cited to Doe in its discussion of injury-in-fact in Randolph,
albeit not in connection to claims of emotional distress.201
3. Breach of an Implied Contract
[60] Finally, some plaintiffs in data breach cases have attempted to
establish injury-in-fact under the theory that the data breach was itself a
breach of an implied contract between them and the defendant, whereby
the defendant, in return for some sort of consideration, had agreed to take
reasonable measures to protect the plaintiffs’ sensitive personal
information. Most commonly, plaintiffs have argued that they believed
reasonable protection of their sensitive personal information was included
in the price they paid for the defendant’s goods or services.
[61] Some courts have recognized that this theory of injury, if pled
correctly, can establish injury-in-fact. The First Circuit, for example, has
twice recognized implied contract claims in data breach cases.202 It held
in Katz that a breach-of-contract claim could establish injury-in-fact,
although the court quickly dismissed the contract claim in Katz on
substantive grounds.203 The court held in another case, Anderson v.
Hannaford Bros. Co., that under Maine law a jury could reasonably find
the existence of an implied contract between a grocery store and its
customers that the store “would not use the credit card data for other
people’s purchases, would not sell the data to others, and would take
200

See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Chao,
540 U.S. at 617–18, 624–25).
201

See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 706–07 (D.C. 2009)
(citing Doe, 540 U.S. at 621).
202

See infra notes 215–16.

203

See Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2012).
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reasonable measures to protect the information.”204 Anderson did not
discuss Article III standing.205
[62] By contrast, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, the Northern
District of Illinois rejected the notion that an implied breach-of-contract
claim could establish injury-in-fact for data breach plaintiffs.206 The
plaintiffs in Remijas had argued that the prices they paid for goods at the
defendant’s department store included a “premium” for proper data
security measures.207 The court dismissed this theory on the ground that,
unlike in other implied contract cases, the alleged deficiency in data
security measures was “extrinsic” to the products purchased by
defendants.208
[63] While establishing injury-in-fact from a breach of contract may be
possible for data breach plaintiffs, successfully pleading such a theory has
proven much more difficult. In In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation, the
plaintiffs, paying members of LinkedIn’s services, alleged that LinkedIn
had breached an implied contract to adequately protect their sensitive
information.209 Dismissing this claim, the court noted that LinkedIn’s
204

Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011).

205

See also Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding
that plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue a consumer protection claim against
AOL, which had publically posted their Internet search histories). Though the rationale
for Doe 1’s finding of injury-in-fact was not entirely clear, the court did agree with
plaintiffs’ claim that “AOL’s collection and disclosure of members’ undeniably sensitive
information is not something that members bargained for when they signed up and paid
fees for AOL’s service.” Id. at 1111.
206

See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis
129574, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 2014).
207

See id. at *4.

208

See id. at *5; see also infra section II.B.2 (cataloguing some disagreement between
data collection cases over whether a breach-of-contract theory supports injury-in-fact).
209

In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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privacy policy and user agreement were the same for both paying and nonpaying members, thus precluding any argument that the policies went to
the basis of the parties’ bargain.210 Likewise, in In re Barnes & Noble Pin
Pad Litigation, the district court held that plaintiffs, whose credit card
numbers had been skimmed from Barnes & Noble pin pad machines, had
failed to plead injury-in-fact premised on the theory that the prices they
paid for Barnes & Noble goods implicitly included a promise to
adequately protect their financial information.211 As the court noted,
Barnes & Noble charged the same price for its products whether payment
was made with a credit card or in cash.212
B. Data Collection Cases
[64] Unlike data breach cases, data collection cases do not focus on the
occurrence or possibility of unauthorized third-party access to sensitive
personal data in the defendant’s possession. Rather, they focus on
allegedly unauthorized collection or transmittal of personal information
conducted by the defendant itself. In the most common data collection
cases, plaintiffs allege that the defendant, typically a social-media website
or other Internet business, has surreptitiously transmitted their personally
identifiable information to third-party advertisers seeking to exploit it for
marketing purposes.

210

See id. at 1093. The court also noted that the Plaintiffs had failed to allege in their
complaint that they had actually read LinkedIn’s privacy policy. Id.
211

See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125730, at *14–15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
212

See id. at *15; cf. Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98707, at *8 n.5 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s argument of
standing based on payment of excessive fees where complaint failed to allege that such
fees were actually paid or that Defendant’s actions reduced the value of the services
received for the fees); McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00944
(VLB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78065, at *24 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (dismissing
plaintiff’s argument of standing based on payment of excessive fees to defendant due to
the complaint’s failure to mention any such fees).
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[65] Data collection cases differ from data breaches in significant ways,
many of which impact courts’ standing analyses. First, data collection and
data breach cases often involve different types of parties. Data collection
cases generally do not involve the transfer of data to criminal third parties
or other entities that are likely to use it to commit identity theft, but rather
involve the transfer of PII to businesses seeking to use it for advertising
and marketing purposes. Second, data collection and data breach cases
often involve different types of information. Plaintiffs in data collection
cases rarely allege that sensitive financial information—Social Security
numbers, credit card numbers—have been illegally used by the Defendant.
Rather, they more typically allege the illegal use of information such as
names, addresses, Internet browsing history, and physical location. This
information’s disclosure poses much less of a threat of identity theft, but
much more of a threat of embarrassment or violation of other traditional
privacy notions.
[66] Plaintiffs in data collection cases have advanced several different
theories of injury-in-fact, including: (1) that the unauthorized use of their
PII deprived them of that information’s economic value; (2) that the
unauthorized use of their PII constituted a breach of contract; (3) that the
unauthorized collection or transmittal of PII from their phones negatively
impacted the phones’ performance; (4) that the unauthorized use of PII
caused emotional harm; (5) that the unauthorized use of PII required
expenditures to prevent that use; and (6) that injury-in-fact is established
by various computer and privacy statutes. As explained below, these
theories have achieved varying levels of success.
[67] Also worth noting is that data collection cases have an even more
recent history than data breach cases. The vast majority of data collection
cases have taken place in district courts in the Ninth Circuit, most notably
the Northern District of California (home of Silicon Valley and many of
the country’s largest technology firms). Consequently, a decision from the
Ninth Circuit could abruptly and dramatically shift the current landscape
of Article III standing in these cases.
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1. Economic Value of PII
[68] One of the most common, but least successful, arguments for
injury-in-fact made by data collection plaintiffs is that the unauthorized
collection or transmittal of their PII deprives them of that information’s
inherent economic value. This argument is premised on the idea that the
type of information collected by defendants in these cases—names, e-mail
addresses, demographic information, Internet browsing and shopping
history—has economic value that advertising and marketing companies
are willing to pay for, at least in the aggregate. Plaintiffs argue that by
taking this information without authorization, defendants have deprived
them of the opportunity to exploit the economic value of this information
themselves.
[69] While courts have not completely ruled out the idea that an
individual’s PII may have value, they have been reluctant to hold that this
value translates into injury-in-fact in data collection cases.213 One of the
first data collection decisions, LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., contains an
influential analysis of this issue. The plaintiffs in LaCourt alleged that the
defendants had placed “cookies” on their Internet browsers to track,
without consent, their Internet usage.214 The plaintiffs alleged that this
213

Courts have also rejected arguments of injury-in-fact based on loss of PII value in
data breach cases. See In re Science Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data
Theft Litig.,No. 12-347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *7 (D.D.C. May 9,
2014); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (S.D. Ohio 2014);
In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *12–
13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013); Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27764, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013). But see
Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861, 866 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“declin[ing]
to hold . . . as a matter of law” that plaintiff had not alleged Article III standing where
plaintiff alleged (1) that it had “paid” Defendant, an Internet application producer, with
the value of his PII in exchange, in part, for a promise to reasonably safeguard that PII,
and (2) a data breach “caused plaintiff to lose the ‘value’ of their PII, in the form of their
breached personal data”).
214

LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50543, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011).
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conduct injured them by collecting information about their browsing
habits without permission or compensation.215 The district court, while
declining “to say that it is categorically impossible for Plaintiffs to allege
some property interest that was compromised by Defendant’s alleged
practices,” held that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled injury under this
theory.216 As the court explained, even if the plaintiffs’ PII has value, the
plaintiffs could not explain how defendants’ collection of this information
denied them some other opportunity to exploit it.217
[70] Subsequent decisions have followed LaCourt’s approach: while
not denying that PII may have economic value, they have dismissed
complaints that fail to explain how plaintiffs could actually exploit the
value of their own PII themselves.218 Other courts have reached similar
conclusions when evaluating the theory not as a basis for standing, but
rather as a part of a plaintiff’s substantive legal claim (for example,
meeting a statutory claim’s damages requirement).219 As a recent decision
215

See id. at *3–4.

216

Id. at *11–12.

217

See id. at *12 (stating that Plaintiffs had failed to allege how Defendant’s conduct
foreclosed them from entering a “value-for-value exchange” with their own data).
218

See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 171124, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); In re Google Android Consumer
Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42724, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013); In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 442 (D. Del. 2013); Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113
JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *10, *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Goodman v.
HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *20–21 (W.D.
Wash. June 26, 2012); Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130840, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011).
219

See Vecchio v. Amazon.com, LLC, No. C11-366RSL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76536,
at *12–13 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012) (“Del Vecchio II”); Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com
Inc., No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138314, at *9–10 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30,
2011) (“Del Vecchio I”); see also In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The court in Del Vecchio II did, with little discussion, find the

42

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

described, plaintiffs will not have standing if they cannot explain how “the
ability to monetize their PII has been diminished or lost by virtue of” the
defendant’s actions.220
[71] An example of a Plaintiff successfully articulating such financial
harm is in Fraley v. Facebook, Inc. The personal information at issue in
Fraley was different than in other cases: the plaintiffs had alleged that
Facebook had used, without authorization, images of them for “sponsored
stories” that announced on the website that the plaintiffs had endorsed (or,
in Facebook parlance, had “liked”) a particular business or brand. 221 The
district court concluded that the Plaintiffs had standing, in part because
they had alleged a violation of a California statutory right against
misappropriation of likeness.222 Additionally, however, the court noted
that the precise harm alleged by the plaintiffs was much more “concrete
and particularized” than other PII cases, since the plaintiffs could
plausibly allege exploitable economic value in “an individual’s
commercial endorsement of a product or brand to his friends.”223
2. Breach of Contract
[72] Plaintiffs in data collection cases have also argued that the
unauthorized collection or transmittal of their PII breached a contract with
the defendant, thus establishing injury-in-fact. Similar to data breach
Plaintiff to have Article III standing, although it appeared to do so either because: (1) the
Plaintiff had alleged the dissemination of sensitive financial information, or (2) the
Plaintiff alleged unauthorized use of her computer. See Del Vecchio II, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76536, at *5–6; see also In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (D. Del. 2013) (noting that standing was found in Del
Vecchio II because Plaintiff alleged dissemination of financial information).
220

In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 442.

221

See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

222

See id. at 796–97.

223

Id. at 796–798 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1991)).
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cases, plaintiffs have argued that unauthorized collection or transmittal of
their PII either (1) breached an express promise by the defendant not to
collect or transmit such information or (2) made the defendant’s services
less valuable than the price that the plaintiff originally paid.
[73] While plaintiffs have had success with this argument, uncertainty
remains about what must precisely be alleged. One decision has suggested
that a “contract breach by itself” does not constitute injury-in-fact.224 This
statement has yet to be truly tested, however, since any plaintiff to
advance a breach-of-contract theory in a data collection case has also
alleged some type of injury, even if it is only that they paid more for a
product or service than they would have had they known the defendant
was exploiting their PII. But whether even that establishes injury-in-fact
is also unclear. In In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation, the court
declined to find injury-in-fact based on the theory that a LinkedIn data
breach denied them the “benefit of the bargain” paid for by their
membership dues.225 The court explained that “in cases where the alleged
wrong stems from allegations about insufficient performance or how a
product functions, courts have required plaintiffs to allege ‘something
more’ than ‘overpaying for a ‘defective’ product.’”226
[74] Other courts, meanwhile, appear to have taken the view that an
allegation of overpayment can establish injury-in-fact in data collection
cases. In Pirozzi v. Apple, which also involved transmission of PII to
third-parties, the court stated that “[o]verpaying for goods or purchasing
goods a person otherwise would not have purchased based upon alleged
misrepresentations by the manufacturer would satisfy the injury-in-fact
and causation requirements for Article III standing.”227 Two other courts
224

See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 171124, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
225

In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

226

Id. at 1094 (quoting In re Toyota Motor Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1165 n.11 (C.D.
Cal. 2011).
227

Pirozzi v. Apple, 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846–47 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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have reached similar conclusions.228 These courts have also been strict,
however, in requiring plaintiffs to properly plead that a material
misrepresentation occurred.229
[75] This theory of injury-in-fact remains unsettled for other reasons.
For example, In re Linkedin User Privacy Litigation cited to decisions
from “no-injury” product liability suits—cases where plaintiffs allege that
a defect in a line of products, though not occurring to them, has
nonetheless harmed them by reducing the value of their particular
product.230 Courts are split generally over how to analyze standing in such
lawsuits,231 and no court has yet considered whether they provide a proper
analogy for the breach-of-contract claims asserted in data collection suits.
Considering also that most decisions on this topic come from one
jurisdiction—the Ninth Circuit—future decisions may remain
unpredictable.
3. Impact on Product Performance
[76] In cases where plaintiffs have alleged that defendants collected or
transmitted PII from their smartphones, courts have been willing to find
228

See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *24–
25; Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at
*14–15 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ assertion that they overpaid for their
smartphones meets the threshold for injury in fact because Defendants allege they would
have paid less for the phones had Defendants not misrepresented the relevant features of
the phones.”).
229

Compare Pirozzi, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (dismissing complaint for lack of standing
because “Plaintiff fails to allege specifically which statements she found material to her
decision to purchase an Apple Device or App”), with Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 F. Supp.
2d 909, 917–18 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding standing based on Plaintiff’s amended
complaint).
230

See Linkedin, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.

231

See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure, 35 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 681, 693–709 (2012).
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injury-in-fact on the theory that such collection or transmittal adversely
impacted the performance of the plaintiffs’ phones, typically through
shortened battery life. The success of these claims depends on how
plausibly the plaintiff can allege that the defendant’s conduct has a real,
rather than simply de minimis, effect on phone performance.232 Plaintiffs
have not succeeded with this theory outside the smartphone context.233
4. Emotional Harm
[77] Whether plaintiffs in data collection cases may establish injury-infact through emotional harm caused by the collection of potentially
embarrassing personal information remains relatively untested. In Low v.
Linkedin Corp., the plaintiff alleged that defendant LinkedIn permitted
third parties to view its members’ personally identifiable browsing history,
and that he was “embarrassed and humiliated by the disclosure” of his
history.234 The court declined to find injury-in-fact on this ground, though
primarily due to the vagueness of the plaintiff’s allegations; as the court

232

Compare In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040,1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(finding standing where Defendant’s practices allegedly “diminished and consumed
iDevice resources, such as storage, battery life, and bandwidth”), and In re Google
Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42724, at *17 (finding standing where Plaintiffs allege “that their batteries discharged
more quickly and that their services were interrupted”), and Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88496, at *19 (finding standing where Defendant’s alleged practices reduce
battery life and “diminish[] the battery’s storage capacity”), with Yunker v. Pandora
Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *14 (denying
standing where Plaintiff “does not allege that he noticed any performance problems or
that he had problems with his phone because of the diminished memory space”), and
Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151035, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (declining to find standing where Plaintiffs alleged “depletion
of two to three seconds of battery capacity”).
233

See LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50543, at *12–13 (concluding that impact of Defendant’s cookies on Plaintiff’s
computer was “de minimis” and insufficient to create injury-in-fact).
234

Low v. Linkedin Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011).
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explained, he had “not alleged how third party advertisers would be able to
infer [his] personal identity” from LinkedIn.235
5. Expenditures to Prevent Unauthorized Use of PII
[78] Courts have found injury-in-fact to exist where data collection
plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have or will spend money to
remedy the defendant’s allegedly unlawful use of their PII. In In re
Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, a plaintiff established injury-infact by alleging that Google’s change in privacy policy motivated him to
purchase a new phone.236 In Hernandez v. Path, Inc., the plaintiff
established injury-in-fact by alleging that he wanted to remove the
defendant’s tracking software from his phone and doing so would cost him
up to $12,250.00.237
6. Invasion of Statutory and Constitutional Rights
[79] Finally, multiple courts have found standing in data collection
cases under the theory that the plaintiff had alleged the invasion of a
statutory or constitutional right. These decisions almost universally cite to
the Supreme Court’s statement in Warth v. Seldin that injury-in-fact “may
exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.’”238 Cases from the Ninth Circuit also frequently
cite to Jewel v. National Security Agency, in which the Ninth Circuit held
a plaintiff could establish injury-in-fact by alleging violations of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), Foreign Intelligence
235

Id. at *8–9.

236

See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 171124, at *19–23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
237

See Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151035,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012).
238

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
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Surveillance Act (“FISA”), and Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).239
Within the Ninth Circuit, courts have found injury-in-fact established
through alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act,240 the
Wiretap Act,241 and the Video Privacy Protection Act.242 Courts have
likewise found injury-in-fact established through alleged violations of
state statutory rights,243 as well as state constitutional rights to privacy.244
Courts have found plaintiffs to satisfy any additional requirement that their
statutory injury be “particularized” (as opposed to a generalized statutory

239

Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 906, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fec v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998)).
240

See Low v. Linkedin Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re
iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054–55; Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp.,
992 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121–23 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Gaos v. Google Inc., No. 5:10-CV4809 EJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44062, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012).
241

See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1055; In re Facebook Privacy
Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., No. C 1004680 JW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154237, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011), aff’d 750
F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014).
242

See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80601, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012).
243

See Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Google, Inc.
Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *65 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2013); Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88496, at *23 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2012).
244

See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1021; Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113
JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691, at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Goodman,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *38–41. These decisions have apparently viewed state
constitutional rights as equivalent to statutory rights for purposes of Article III standing.
See, e.g., Goodman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88496, at *38–39 (“A state constitutional or
statutory provision conferring standing does not replace the requirements of Article III,
but it serves to expand standing in federal court ‘to the full extent permitted under Article
III.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997)).
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grievance), so long as their specific PII has been affected by the alleged
statutory violation.245
[80] Parties relying on decisions from the Ninth Circuit should be aware
that the outer parameters of Warth remain unsettled,246 and thus not every
circuit is guaranteed to agree with Jewel’s holding. For example, one of
the few data breach cases to consider statutory injury, In re Barnes &
Noble Pin Pad Litigation, rejected injury-in-fact on the alleged basis of
defendant’s violation of state breach notification laws and explained that
“[p]laintiffs must plead an injury beyond a statutory violation to meet the
standing requirement of Article III.”247
IV. INJURY-IN-FACT IN DATA BREACH AND DATA COLLECTION CASES
AFTER CLAPPER
[81] As the above cases show, federal courts remain fractured in their
approach to injury-in-fact in data breach and data collection cases. While
courts have reached consistent conclusions with respect to some theories
of standing, they have sharply disagreed over others. Clapper, which
discusses both the collection of data and the ability of plaintiffs to prove
injury-in-fact through the risk of future harm, presents an opportunity to
resolve some of these differences of opinion. Yet Clapper’s precise effect
on data privacy cases remains unsettled. Data collection cases have not
addressed Justice Alito’s majority opinion in any significant detail, while
the few data breach decisions to do so have drawn different conclusions
245

See, e.g., Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (“Because Plaintiffs have alleged that their
information has been disclosed to third parties by LinkedIn’s policies, Plaintiffs have
sufficiently articulated, with particularity, injury as to themselves for the purposes of
Article III standing.”).
246

The Supreme Court recently granted, and then dismissed as improvidently granted,
certiorari in a case that contributed to an existing split over the ability of litigants to
establish standing solely on the invasion of statutory rights (that is, without any proof of
real-world injury). See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012).
247

In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125730,at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (citing Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222
F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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about Clapper’s effect on existing standing law. Still, these cases do
suggest, at the very least, that lower courts are inclined to interpret
Clapper as rejecting the idea that any increase in a risk of future harm may
support injury-in-fact. While not a sweeping, across-the-board adoption
of Clapper’s “certainly impending” language, this development would still
have significant consequences for data privacy litigation.
A. Clapper’s Impact in Lower Courts So Far
1. Data Breach Cases
[82] To date, Clapper has received extended analysis in seven data
breach cases: In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation,248 In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation,249 Galaria
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,250 Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings,
Inc.,251 In re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup
Tape Data Theft Litigation,252 Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc,253 and In re
Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation.254 These decisions have reached
different conclusions about Clapper’s impact on standing law. The courts
in In re Sony, Moyer, and In re Adobe expressly disavowed that Clapper
248

See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.Supp.2d
942, 960–63 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
249

See In re Barnes & Noble, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *7–12.

250

See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651–57 (S.D. Ohio
2014).
251

See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32118, at *11–14, *17–23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014).
252

See In re SAIC Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12–347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64125, at *19–33 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014).
253

See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at
*14–16 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
254

See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124126, at *16–32 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014).
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constituted any sort of substantial reworking of standing doctrine. 255 The
other decisions, meanwhile, relied, at least in part, on Clapper’s “certainly
impending” language to dismiss claims of injury premised on an increased
future risk of identity theft.256
[83] In re Sony followed a previous decision of the Southern District of
California, which had held that customers of Sony who had their personal
information compromised in a massive data breach could establish injuryin-fact on the basis of an increased risk of future identity theft, even
without allegations that any information had actually been used by third
parties.257 Sony asked the court to revisit that holding in light of
Clapper.258 The court did so, and concluded that Clapper did not change
its earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing to sue.259 While the
court noted Clapper’s “certainly impending” language differed from the
“real and immediate” language used by the Ninth Circuit in Krottner, it
concluded that “Clapper did not set forth a new Article III framework, nor
did the Supreme Court’s decision overrule previous precedent requiring
that the harm be ‘real and immediate.”260 The Clapper plaintiffs’
“speculative chain of possibilities,” the Sony court appeared to believe,
would have been insufficient to establish injury-in-fact even under

255

See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961; In re Adobe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126
*24–27; Moyer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *12, *15.
256

See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125730, at *7–12 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013); Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 657; Strautins,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *13; In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *50–
51.
257

See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63.

258

See id. at 960.

259

See id. at 961.

260

Id.
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Krottner, thus suggesting that Clapper had simply “reiterated an already
well-established framework” for assessing injury-in-fact.261
[84] In re Barnes & Noble, meanwhile, involved a “skimming” security
breach at the book retailer through which criminals succeeded in
collecting credit and debit card numbers used by customers on the store’s
pin pad machines.262 At the time the plaintiffs sued Barnes & Noble, only
one had suffered a fraudulent charge, which had been previously
reimbursed.263 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ various theories
for standing.264 Most notably, the court rejected as too speculative the
plaintiffs’ claims of an increased risk of future identity theft, explaining
that “[a]s the Supreme Court held in Clapper, ‘threatened injury must be
certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact, and . . . [a]llegations of
possible future injury are not sufficient.’”265 The court likewise rejected
the plaintiffs’ theory of standing based on their mitigating expenses,
noting that “such expenses would not qualify as actual injuries under
Clapper” and that “Plaintiffs ‘cannot manufacture standing by incurring
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.’”266 The court also rejected
the plaintiffs’ theory of standing based on anxiety and emotional distress,
as “there is no indication there is an imminent threat” of identity theft.267

261

Id.

262

See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125730, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013).
263

See id. at *4–5.

264

See id. at *16–17.

265

Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147).

266

Id. at *11 (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155).

267

Id. at *13–14.
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[85] The Northern District of Illinois again addressed Clapper’s impact
on data breach litigation in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.268 At
issue in Strautins was a breach at the South Carolina Department of
Revenue, whereby hackers were able to obtain the Social Security
numbers of millions of individuals, as well as hundreds of thousands of
tax records and credit and debit card numbers.269 Plaintiff, a South
Carolina taxpayer, brought suit against the data security company
responsible for protecting the Department of Revenue, alleging the
company’s negligence had caused her injury in the form of an increased
risk of identity theft.270 The district court, however, concluded that
“Clapper compels rejection of [Plaintiff’s] claim that an increased risk of
identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for
standing.”271 According to the court, any risk of identity theft raised by
the plaintiff did not rise to Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard.272
Likewise, Clapper required rejection of plaintiff’s argument that she had
standing based on present expenses to mitigate the risk of future identity
theft.273
[86] Unlike in In re Barnes & Noble, the court in Strautins attempted to
reconcile Clapper with the Seventh Circuit’s earlier standing decision in
Pisciotta.274 The district court expressed skepticism that Pisciotta’s
statement about injury-in-fact—that it could arise from a mere increase in

268

See Struatins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32118 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014).
269

See id. at *1.

270

See id. at *2.

271

See id. at *11.

272

See id. at *13.

273

See id. at *13–14 n.9.

274

See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *18, *20–22.
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the risk of future harm—had any continuing validity after Clapper.275 In
the court’s view, “Clapper seems rather plainly to reject the premise,
implicit in Pisciotta and fairly explicit in Elk Grove Village, that any
marginal increase in risk is sufficient to confer standing.”276 The court
noted that Clapper had “expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard.”277 The court ultimately
hedged its rejection of Pisciotta, however, by dismissing the plaintiff’s
complaint on the alternative ground that she had not plausibly alleged the
theft of her own PII and thus had failed to state a claim.278
[87] In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the Southern
District of Ohio similarly relied on Clapper to reject a claim of injury-infact premised on an increased risk of future identity theft. 279 Like in
Strautins, the plaintiffs in Galaria sued after hackers gained entry into the
defendant’s computer network, although neither plaintiff alleged that their
specific information had been misused.280 The district court held the
275

See id. at *17–19.

276

Id. at *18.

277

Id. at *18–19.

278

See id. at *28–29. A subsequent decision from the Northern District of Illinois,
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 4627893 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16,
2014), likewise found Clapper to preclude standing for a group of data breach plaintiffs,
though without expressly finding Pisciotta to be abrogated. The court in Remijas
suggested both that Pisciotta was factually reconcilable with Clapper’s “certainly
impending” standard (a premise that seems to be rejected in cases such as Strautins) and
that Clapper’s “certainly impending” requirement was less rigorous outside the contexts
of national security and constitutional law. See id. at *3; see also Tierney v. Advocate
Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 13 CV 6237, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2014) (holding that only
those data breach plaintiffs who had been notified of fraudulent activity had alleged
injury-in-fact, though not analyzing the impact of Clapper on prior Seventh Circuit
standing law).
279

See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:13-CV-118, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23798, at *22–24 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014).
280

See id. at *2–4.
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plaintiffs could not establish injury-in-fact based on an alleged increased
risk of identity theft, as such risk was not, as Clapper required, “certainly
impending.”281 The court also relied on Clapper in rejecting the plaintiffs’
theory of standing based on their present expenditures to mitigate against
the risk of future identity theft, and quoted Clapper’s statement that
litigants “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not
certainly impending.”282 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments
for injury-in-fact based on “loss of privacy” and on the alleged deprivation
of value of their PII.283
[88] The district court in Galaria, like the court in Strautins, also
considered Clapper’s impact on previous decisions about data breach
litigation and Article III standing.284 The court noted that other data
breach cases where plaintiffs were found to have standing—including both
Krottner and Pisciotta—had been decided prior to Clapper.285 The court
further noted, as did the court in Strautins, that Clapper had “specifically
rejected the idea that an injury is certainly impending if there is an
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ it will occur.”286
[89] In SAIC, the district court reached conclusions similar to those of
Strautins and Galaria. However, unlike those cases, SAIC arose from a
theft of data tapes where it was unclear that the thief was even aware that

281

See id. at *23–24.

282

Id. at *24–25 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013)).

283

See id. at *28–29 (concluding that the plaintiffs would have standing to pursue a tort
claim for invasion of privacy, but finding that their complaint failed to state such a
claim).
284

See id. at *22.

285

See Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23798, at *20–22.

286

Id. at *22 (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147).
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she procured sensitive personal data.287 The district court held that the
plaintiffs could not establish standing based on an increased risk of future
identity theft.288 Even if that risk was, as the plaintiffs alleged, 9.5 times
higher after the breach occurred, Clapper established that “[t]he degree by
which the harm has increased is irrelevant—instead, the question is
whether the harm is certainly impending.”289 The court further noted that
the plaintiff’s alleged risk of identity theft failed to meet even Clapper’s
“substantial risk” language.290
[90] SAIC also considered the effect that Clapper had on previous data
privacy decisions.291 Like Strautins and Galaria, it viewed Clapper as
calling into question decisions such as Krottner and Pisciotta.292 It
described decisions finding standing based on an increased risk of identity
theft as “decided pre-Clapper or rel[iant] on pre-Clapper precedent and
are, at best, thinly reasoned.”293 The court rejected the continued viability
of an “increased risk” theory of standing: “After all, an increased risk or
credible threat of impending harm is plainly different from certainly
impending harm, and certainly impending harm is what the Constitution
and Clapper require.”294

287

See In re SAIC Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12-347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64125, at *1 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014).
288

See id. at *7.

289

Id. at *22.

290

See id. at *26–27.

291

See id. at *31–32.

292

See id. at *31–32.

293

In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *31–32.

294

Id. at *32–34.
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[91] In Moyer, by contrast, another judge from the Northern District of
Illinois disagreed that Clapper had abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Pisciotta.295 The plaintiffs in Moyer alleged that they were at
an increased risk of identity theft after using their credit and debit cards at
Michaels Stores within a time period during which Michaels may have
experienced a data security attack.296 Though the district court ultimately
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, it first
concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged Article III injury-in-fact due to an
elevated risk of identity theft.297
[92] Notably, the court in Moyer disagreed with any suggestion from
Strautins and Barnes & Noble that Clapper had abrogated the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta.298 According to the court, Pisciotta
remained good law for two reasons.299 First, Clapper involved a
constitutional challenge to a federal national security law, and the extent to
which its standing analysis applied outside that specific context was “an
open question.”300 Second, the court noted that other Supreme Court
decisions, such as Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus301 and Geertson Seed
Farms,302 demonstrate that the Supreme Court has also applied a less
rigorous standing analysis than Clapper’s for allegations of future
295

See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at
*15 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
296

See id. at *2.

297

See id. at *19, *24.

298

See id. at *14–15.

299

See id. at *15–16, *19.

300

Id. at *15.

301

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (permitting preenforcement challenge to state statute criminalizing false statements about candidates
during political campaigns).
302

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010).

57

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 1

injury.303 The court further observed that Clapper was factually
distinguishable from the plaintiffs’ claims because while at least one
customer of Michaels had reported identity theft after the security breach,
in Clapper, there was “no evidence that the relevant risk of harm had ever
materialized in similar circumstances.”304
[93] Most recently, in In re Adobe, the Northern District of California
agreed with In re Sony that, despite Clapper, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Krottner remained good law.305 The claims in In re Adobe arose from a
sophisticated, weeks-long hacking operation through which hackers
obtained and decrypted the personal information and credit card numbers
of over 38 million Adobe customers.306 Citing to SAIC, Strautins, and
Galaria, among other cases, Adobe argued that the plaintiffs could not
establish injury-in-fact through an alleged increased risk of identity
theft.307 The court disagreed, and noted that “Clapper did not change the
law governing Article III standing.”308 As the court explained, Krottner
was already “closer to Clapper’s ‘certainly impending’ language” than it
was to the Second Circuit’s rejected “objective reasonable likelihood”
standard.309 Regardless, the court found the plaintiffs’ allegations, which
involved an elaborate crime clearly designed to obtain personal
information, some of which had already had been misused, to plausibly
allege “certainly impending” harm.310
303

See Moyer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *16–18.

304

Id. at *19.
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See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124126, at *32 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014).
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See id. at *6–7.
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Id. at *21.
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Id. at *24
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Id. at *26.
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See id. at *28.
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[94] Other data breach decisions have mentioned Clapper, albeit with
less analysis. The District of Kansas cited Clapper in a decision finding
no standing where no data breach had been alleged to have occurred—a
position courts consistently reached even before Clapper.311 Likewise, the
District of New Jersey cited Clapper in Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc.,312
which dismissed for lack of standing a plaintiff who claimed that she
suffered injury-in-fact because she avoided treatment at hospitals served
by the defendant company, which had previously experienced a data
breach and which the plaintiff believed to employ inadequate data security
measures.313 The district court cited to Clapper in dismissing this claim,
though its analysis suggested that it did not view Clapper as changing in
any substantive way the Third Circuit’s binding analysis in Reilly.314
[95] These opinions demonstrate different perspectives on how Clapper
impacts existing standing law. On one side, decisions such as Strautins,
Galaria, and SAIC view Clapper as abrogating appellate decisions like
Pisciotta. On the other side, In re Sony, Moyer, and In re Adobe assert
that Clapper did not effect any sort of substantial change in standing
law.315 These opinions also demonstrate the Clapper majority opinion’s

311

See Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 12-CV-2618-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98707, at *4–8 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013).
312

See Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 466 (D.N.J. 2013).

313

See id. at 468–71.

314

See id. at 466–67.

315

Another example of courts’ taking fundamentally different views on Clapper is a
comparison of In re Sony with Polanco. While both decisions found Clapper not to have
disrupted existing standing law, In re Sony viewed Clapper as consistent with the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Krottner, while Polanco viewed it as consistent with the Third
Circuit’s decision in Reilly. Compare In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 942, 961–63 (“the Court
finds both Clapper and Krottner controlling”), with Polanco 988 F. Supp. 2d at 466
(noting the similarity between the holdings in Reilly and Clapper).
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open-ended nature.316 Though Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC recite
Clapper’s “certainly impending” language, no decision conclusively
endorses such language as the governing standard for assessing all claims
of injury-in-fact premised on future harm. Rather, all three opinions
follow Clapper’s approach and decline to decide whether a “substantial
risk” standard might apply in other circumstances.317
[96] Still, the courts in Barnes & Noble, Strautins, Galaria, SAIC, and
Polanco all interpreted Clapper as imposing some sort of objective
imminence threshold that an increased risk of harm must meet before it
constitutes injury-in-fact. That is, all five decisions do appear to agree
that, under Clapper, injury-in-fact requires something more than just a
slight risk of future harm. Even In re Sony and In re Adobe, which take
more limited views of Clapper’s effect on standing law, reached arguably
consistent results. Though In re Sony admittedly cites with approval
decisions such as Pisciotta, 318 the district courts in both cases held only
that Clapper did not change the Ninth Circuit’s “real and immediate”
requirement for future harm—an arguably more rigorous standard than the
“increased risk” language rejected in Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC.319

316

See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32118, at *5 n.11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014) (noting that “the import of Clapper for
standing analysis in the Seventh Circuit a question on which reasonable minds may
differ”).
317

See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118 at *8–9; Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23798 at *14–15; In re SAIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125 at *25–26.
318

See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp.
2d 942, 961–62 n.8 (citing favorably to Pisciotta and other decisions stating that a mere
increased risk of harm can support standing).
319

See id. at 961. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-05226-LHK, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014).
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[97] Moyer, by contrast, appears to have taken a position less
reconcilable with an objective imminence requirement.320 Unlike in In re
Sony, the court in Moyer did rely on Pisciotta for its standing analysis.321
And the court concluded that plaintiffs had established standing by
alleging “a credible, non-speculative risk of future harm”—a standard that
would appear to be less rigorous than even the Ninth Circuit’s “real and
immediate” standard.322 Still, Moyer’s more expansive view of standing
remains the minority among the post-Clapper data breach cases.
[98] In short, while lower courts may have reached different
conclusions about the extent of Clapper’s effect on data privacy litigation,
they have been more consistent in viewing Clapper as rejecting the
proposition that any increase risk of future harm can support Article III
standing. Though this conclusion is consistent with much of the standing
law to come before Clapper, it is in tension with some decisions, such as
the Seventh Circuit’s in Pisciotta. Whether Clapper will ultimately result,
as Strautins, Galaria, and SAIC suggest, in the abrogation of decisions like
Pisciotta remains to be seen.
2. Data Collection Cases
[99] With respect to data collection lawsuits, Clapper has been more
notable in its absence than in its presence. To date, Clapper has appeared
as a brief citation in three data collection cases: Yunker, In re Google
Android Consumer Privacy Litigation, and In re iPhone Application
Litigation.323 While both Yunker and In re Google Android quote

320

See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588 at
*19 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
321

See id. (noting that holding on standing “follows from Pisciotta”).

322

See id. at *17.
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Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42691, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.,
No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42724, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26,
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Clapper’s “certainly impending” language as part of their general
recitation of standing requirements,324 neither case suggests that Clapper
affects previous standing doctrine. And other courts, whether cognizant of
Clapper or not, have continued to find injury-in-fact established for data
collection plaintiffs under theories of overpayment for goods and
services,325 impact on device performance,326 and invasion of statutory
rights.327
A. Clapper and Data Privacy Cases Going Forward
[100] An analysis of Clapper itself supports the conclusions reached by
most of the lower courts that have considered its effect on standing law.
While the majority opinion’s “certainly impending” language suggests a
high hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to prove injury-in-fact premised on an
increased risk of future harm, the opinion also leaves open the possibility
that such a requirement may not apply in all cases.328 The majority’s
rejection of the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable
likelihood”329standard, meanwhile, is much more unequivocal, and thus
much more likely to affect standing cases going forward. Still, a farreaching impact is not guaranteed: Clapper is unclear enough about the

2013); In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169220, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013).
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See Yunker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42691 at *8; In re Google, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42724 at *11–12.
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See, e.g., In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *23–24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
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See, e.g., id. at *19–20.
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See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp.
2d 434, 442 (D. Del. 2013).
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Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013).
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Id. at 1147.
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scope of cases to which it applies that lower courts could, as Moyer
suggests, effectively limit it to the national security context.330 Moreover,
even if courts do generally adopt a broad reading of Clapper, it may
simply have the effect of pushing data privacy litigants toward other
theories of standing that do not depend on future injury.
[101] As mentioned above, viewed in light of the issues germane to data
breach and data collection cases, Clapper’s most notable aspect is its
statement that threatened harm must be “certainly impending”331 in order
to constitute injury-in-fact. Indeed, this language from Clapper has been
its most widely quoted among lower courts, and has obvious relevance for
cases where injury is alleged in the form of either an increased risk of
future identity theft or present expenses incurred to mitigate that risk.332
But as explained earlier, the Clapper majority opinion reserves decision
on whether “certainly impending ” is the only applicable standard for
assessing threatened injuries.333 In a footnote it concedes that “[o]ur cases
do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain
that the harms they identify will come about,”334 and recognizes that a
separate “substantial risk” standard may also exist for injury-in-fact
premised on the risk of future harm.335 Thus, and as the decisions
discussed above demonstrate, while courts may choose to adopt Clapper’s
330

See Moyer v. Michaels Stores, No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *19
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); see also In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV05226-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014) (observing
that “Clapper’s discussion of standing arose in the sensitive context of a claim that other
branches of government were violating the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that its standing analysis was unusually rigorous as a result”).
331

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155.
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See supra section III.A.
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See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5.
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Id.
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Id.
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“certainly impending” language as the substantive requirement for
alleging injury-in-fact in future data breach cases, Clapper itself does not
necessarily compel them to do so.336
[102] Clapper is much more unequivocal, however, in its rejection of the
Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard for
assessing future injury.337 This aspect of the majority opinion may be
more likely to alter the existing legal landscape on data litigation and
injury-in-fact. Indeed, it is the rejection of the Second Circuit’s standard,
rather than the endorsement of a “certainly impending” standing, that
Strautins and Galaria view as abrogating or potentially abrogating
previous circuit court opinions.338 This does not mean, of course, that
Clapper necessarily abrogates the holdings of decisions like Pisciotta or
Krottner; lower courts may still conclude, like in In re Sony and In re
Adobe, that the risk of injury in those cases satisfied whatever minimum
threshold of probability that Clapper imposed. Still, if Clapper makes
clear that an “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard is inappropriate
for assessing injury-in-fact based on a risk of future harm, it becomes
difficult to see how establishing injury-in-fact based on only a “small” or
“increased” risk of harm is not also inappropriate.
[103] Aside from the scope of Clapper’s holding, courts in data privacy
cases may also be able to distinguish the decision on factual grounds.
336

In its most recent statement about standing and future harm, the Court continued to
leave this issue open. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341
(2014) (“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly
impending,’ or there is a ‘‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”) (quoting Clapper,
133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5).
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See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“As an initial matter, the Second Circuit’s
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard is inconsistent with our requirement that
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.’”) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
338

See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32118, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No.
2:13-CV-118, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23798, at *22 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014).
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Justice Alito began Clapper’s standing analysis by noting the presence of
two factors that, in his view, called for a conservative standing analysis:
(1) that the plaintiffs’ claims would “force [the Court] to decide whether
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional”;339 and (2) that the plaintiffs’ claims
would require the Court “to review actions of the political branches in the
fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”340 Neither of these
factors is typically present in a data breach case. Still, most courts so far
have not construed this potion of Clapper as precluding its application to
data breach cases.
[104] Clapper’s impact on other theories of standing used in data privacy
cases is not obvious. Most of these other theories allege the existence of a
present, rather than future, injury.341 Perhaps most notably, Clapper
would seemingly have little effect on plaintiffs who allege injury from an
invasion of statutory rights—a theory of standing that may become
increasingly available to data privacy plaintiffs if legislatures enact
additional statutory causes of action.342 If lower courts decide to read
339

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.

340

Id.; see also LEADING CASE: II. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: C. StandingChallenges to Government Surveillance-Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 127
HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (arguing that Clapper’s “certainly impending” language
“should only be applied to litigants challenging governmental action in foreign affairs or
national security”).
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A possible exception may be standing premised on anxiety and emotional distress due
to the perceived risk of future identity theft, which some courts have tied to the
reasonableness of the threat causing the anxiety. The plaintiffs in Clapper did not make
any sort of emotional-distress claim, however.
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See Patricia Cove, Note, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: Finding Plaintiffs a
Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62
CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 769 (2013) (advocating for legislation to give plaintiffs a data
breach suits a statutory cause of action, thereby overcoming previous decisions denying
such plaintiffs standing). The plaintiffs in both Strautins and Galaria, for example,
alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in addition to their other claims and
failed. See Strautins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32118, at *7; Galaria, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23798, at *2. But see In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 13-CV-05226-LK,
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Clapper broadly, more plaintiffs may plead these alternative theories of
standing in place of theories premised on the risk of future harm.
[105] Clapper accordingly has the potential to change how injury-in-fact
is alleged in data privacy cases, particularly if courts continue to find that
its rejection of the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood”
standard requires abandonment of similarly lax language about injury-infact found in other circuits’ case law. But given the other potential
avenues for plaintiffs to assert injury-in-fact in data breach cases, it is less
certain that Clapper will significantly reduce the number of data privacy
plaintiffs who manage to proceed forward with their claims.
V. CONCLUSION
[106] Even after Clapper, federal courts continue to differ in their
conclusions about the Article III standing of plaintiffs in data breach and
data collection lawsuits. Despite this lack of consensus, the data privacy
decisions issued in the wake of Clapper do suggest that lower courts,
while not likely to all impose Clapper’s “certainly impending” language
as an across-the-board standing requirement for plaintiffs, are nonetheless
generally inclined to view Clapper as a rejection of the laxer standing
requirements of decisions such as the Seventh Circuit’s in Pisciotta and
even the Ninth Circuit’s in Krottner. Such a view, if widely adopted,
could have a significant impact on data privacy litigation. Plaintiffs
alleging injury-in-fact due to an increased risk of future harm will more
likely encounter a rigorous, objective judicial analysis of how imminent
the alleged risk of harm actually is. This in turn may push data privacy
plaintiffs to other theories of standing, such as invasion of statutory rights,
which do not depend on future harm. In sum, while Clapper’s exact
impact on data privacy litigation still remains undetermined, it has already
demonstrated its potential to shift the current standing debate in such cases
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124126, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs
had not alleged independent injury to support a claim for violation of the California
Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.2, which requires prompt notification
about data breaches).
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away from the risk of future harm and toward allegations of presently
suffered injury.
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